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ABSTRACT  
Lobster (Homarus americanus) ranks first in Canada’s fisheries, but Quebec lobster represents only 6% of eastern 
Canada landings. During the peak of the fishing season in Quebec as elsewhere, supply is at its maximum and price 
is the lowest.   For this reason, there has been considerable interest in Quebec in developing holding technologies 
that allow for price arbitrage over time.  Such techniques already exist in other parts of Eastern Canada, but are less 
developed in Québec. This paper looks at the likely impacts of fishermen’s associations in Québec adopting lobster 
holding technologies that enable price arbitrage.  We performed a technical and financial analysis that compared 
several alternative configurations of lobster holding technologies for Grande Rivière Québec. Of the configurations 
presented, a technique was proposed which seemed to maximize discounted profits.   However, these results are 
nuanced by the fact that the overall effects of price arbitrage on the price signal over time may result in inter-
temporal resource rents being competed away.  When we compared our results to other areas of Eastern Canada, this 
raised new questions about long term profitability, especially in a fishery such as Quebec, where management is 
based largely on input controls.   We estimated a price flexibility equation as a function of lagged landings, seasonal 
dummy variables, the exchange rate between the United Stated and Canada, using SIMETAR-2008. A comparison 
of  the  two  models,  one  from  Quebec  and  one  from  Nova  Scotia,  suggests  that  investing  in  lobster  holding 
technologies causes a smoothing of price variability. The results suggest that fishermen would try to maximize their 
profits by adopting an inter-temporal arbitrage strategy, but that profits in the absence of output controls, according 
to fisheries economic theory, could provoke an upward pressure on effective effort which would then accelerate the 
open access solution.  This could negate the price arbitrage effect. 
Keywords: Lobster holding, Price arbitrage, Property rights  
 
Introduction: 
 
For many years, American lobster (Homarus americanus) has taken first place in Canada’s fisheries in terms of 
value. It ranks first in Canadian marine products exportations (Atlantic lobster summit, 2007). Canadian caught 
American lobster occupies 50% of the North American market with 52 082 MT produced in 2006 (DFO, 2009). 
Quebec lobster represents 6% of eastern Canada landings (DFO, 2009). 
 
In  the  Gaspésie  in  Québec,  lobster  production  represents  a  quarter  (25.7%)  of  Quebec  landings  with  830  MT 
produced in 2006 (Magasouba, 2007). The fishing season starts in April and ends in June. During this period, supply 
is at its maximum and consequently, the price is the lowest. Moreover, at the end and after the fishing season in 
Gaspésie, the lobster price is relatively high because of the increased demand at the height of the summer tourist 
season (Acehson, 2003). 
 
Because of this, communities such as the Grande-Rivière Fisherman’s Association are seeking to maximize their 
profit by capturing inter-temporal price effects, by adopting lobster holding technologies aimed at allowing fishers 
to hold lobsters and sell them during periods when prices are normally higher.  This paper begins by presenting an 
overview of the technical and financial analysis conducted on a holding system technology (Belhabib, 2010). The 
idea behind this is that adopting technologies that allow groups of fishermen to engage in price arbitrage over time 
may lead to better profits for them.  This may lengthen the relevant buying season and allow fishermen the chance to 
capture price effects. Then, we seek to answer two questions.  First, is this the best solution for a small community 
to resolve profitability problems?  Second, what are the longer term effects of investment in new technologies aimed 
at more effective price arbitrage? Not surprisingly, that depends upon the degree to which the evolution of real effort IIFET 2010 Montpellier Proceedings 
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is  controlled  by  public  management.  To  get  some  insights  into  these  questions,  we  estimated  price  flexibility 
equations for Quebec and Nova Scotia markets, as a function of lagged landings, seasonal dummy variables, and the 
exchange rate between the United Stated and Canada, in order to capture effects of the export market, time and 
inflation rate. This was done to filter or account for their effects on past and actual price variations. We discuss the 
long term effects of holding technologies on price variations by comparing the two models.  We explore the impacts 
of these effects on the evolution of the net present value of profit, under the current management regime in Québec. .  
We then present some conclusions, and a caution regarding the long term benefits of price arbitrage in fisheries 
mainly managed by input controls. 
 
An ‘optimal’ technology for Grande Rivière lobster fishers 
 
Grande-Rivière is situated in the Gaspésie in Québec, one of the most productive lobster fishing areas in Canada. 
The fishing season starts in April and ends in late June (figure 1). To maximize their profits, the producers ‘Les 
producteurs  de  homard  de  Grande-Rivière  Inc.’  wanted  to  invest  in  holding  technologies  that  allow  them  to 
lengthen the fishing season and capture the large price variation effects.  
 
Figure 1. Lobster Fishing Districts in Atlantic Canada. 
 
 
 
Source. Fisheries and Aquaculture Nova Scotia, 2007
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We identified 5 holding scenarios in the technical and financial study, based on 2 types of water circulation systems, 
aimed to hold a maximum of 20000 lb of lobster for the producers in Grande-Rivière, a small fishing community. In 
the flow through system, where the water is continuously renewed and cooled, two scenarios were analyzed: a 
system using a concrete basin and a system with fiberglass basins. For the water recirculation system, we considered 
three different scenarios based on a concrete basin, fiberglass basins and the Aquabitech condo system (small plastic 
rooms insolating each individual lobster). While performing the technical and financial study we took into account 
the  most  important  biological  parameters  (mortality  rate  and  weight  loss),  water  temperature  and  technical 
parameters (water use and water cooling cost). The best technology recommended was the scenario using a concrete 
basin in a closed loop. This configuration maximised the profit of the holding technology assuming prices of 12$/lb, 
which were at a mean of 4.61 $/lb for the nominal ex-vessel prices and with standard deviation 1.41. The cost of 
water cooling is minimised because the temperature is held by using an isolation system. Furthermore, the producers 
proposed using their own materials to reduce the investment cost. The study showed that for most of the cases, 
                                                 
1 http://www.gov.ns.ca/fish/marine/map/lobster_full.shtml 
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investing in mid-term holding technology is profitable. It also appeared by performing a sensitivity analysis that 
price is the most critical parameter which influences the NPV of the project. However, this parameter is estimated 
through  a  ten  year  horizon  based  on  an  evaluation  of  the  actual  average  nominal  ex-vessel  price  of  5$/lb 
(Magassouba, 2007). This price is the average of the nominal prices, and adjusted for inflation. The figure 2 below 
represents the variation of prices through time from January 1990 to December 2008. 
 
 
Figure 2. (a) Variations of filtered and non filtered prices in Quebec Province (January, 1990 - December, 2008); (b) 
Variations of the monthly inflation rate. 
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Figure 2 shows that the prices are varying through time with an increasing trend, and not especially related to the 
inflation rate. This suggests that there are structural changes in the supply-demand relationship for lobster that has 
driven the price upwards. Even if the inflation rate in average (2.2%) is close to the inflation rate used in the 
technical and financial study which was fixed at 2%, the standard deviation is relatively high (1.32) showing volatile 
monthly inflation rates varying historically from 0.0001% to 6.91% (Bank of Canada, 2009). In addition to that, the 
variation of prices has been estimated at ±30%, which is an indicator of the non stationary prices (for a mean of 
4.61$/lb and a standard deviation of 1.41). However, in the technical and financial study we took into account the 
seasonal variations of prices by differentiating the cost per pound of delivering lobster, and the consumer purchase 
price estimated by the fishermen at 12$/lb. That is, at the beginning of the fishing season, prices are low. Thereafter, 
prices are increasing at the end of the fishing season which corresponds to the tourist season. The lobster price 
variations are cyclical and increasing through time as shown in figure 2.  
 
New holding technologies permit fishers to engage in price arbitrage, which captures the effect of seasonal prices 
spikes.  However, the effects of this price arbitrage on the variations of prices are unknown in the long term. In 
addition to that, fishermen behaviour could be affected. Consequently, the real question is: what are the long term 
effects of price arbitrage on the variability of prices and on the behaviour of fishermen and their profit over the long 
term,  considering  that  effective  effort  could  be  increased  through  time,  and  resource  rents  could  possibly  be IIFET 2010 Montpellier Proceedings 
  4 
competed away.  To address this issue, we do a comparative analysis of prices in Nova Scotia compared to prices in 
Québec.   
 
 
Ways of looking at price series and arbitrage by comparing Quebec with Nova Scotia 
 
Data analysis  
 
There are many factors directly affecting lobster harvests and therefore lobster prices. One factor is the season 
length.  Nova Scotia has longer season lengths, due to their offshore lobster fishery, and the fact that over time, 
fishers may have been able to manage their effective effort more efficiently.  The second aspect is the adoption of 
lobster  holding  technology.  The  third  aspect,  and  related  to  the  discussions  in  this  paper,  is  the  nature  and 
advancement of property rights in the fishery, and the extent to which these are recognized by the Federal and 
Provincial management agencies.  Nova Scotia has been characterized as a fishery that, in addition to these other 
characteristics,  is  moving  away  from  a  strictly  input-based  regulation  towards  more  comprehensive  effort 
management (Millerp and Breen, 2010).  This may permit successful adoption of lobster holding technologies and 
longer seasons, which have been put in place through joint planning agreements.  Quebec, on the other hand, has a 
mainly inshore fishery, which is based upon input controls, and which is managed on the one hand by Federal 
fisheries managers in the water, but where onshore operations are affected by provincial policy.  Therefore, what we 
would expect to see in comparing the two regions is 1) Comparatively longer seasons in Nova Scotia, and; 2) 
Comparatively lower variations in price in Nova Scotia, and 3) A similar average price overall between Quebec and 
Nova Scotia.  Ex-vessel lobster prices vary in response to the quantity landed, and typically show considerable 
seasonal variations in response to changing demand and supply conditions in wholesale and retail markets (Gardner 
Pinfold, 1991). Platt (2008) shows that the ex-vessel prices vary across years, seasons, and even months based on 
the supply of harvested fish available at that time. These factors, among others, explain partially the variance of the 
resource price (Murillas and Chomorro, 2006). In addition to the influence of the quantity landed on price variations, 
seasonality has its own effect on lobster prices (Wang and Kellogg, 1988). In these cases, seasonality is introduced 
in the model as seasonal dummy variables. As a twelve month cycle permits a more refined analysis than seasons 
(Cheng and Townsend, 1993), months are used in this paper.  
 
The estimation of price flexibility will be based on an equation integrating landings. Jaffry et al. (1999) defined the 
own price flexibility of a species as the percentage change in its price due to a 1% change in the quantity landed of 
that species. This change takes some time to occur; consequently lagged landings at a period of (t-1) were tested and 
are used in this model. The price flexibility equation can be expressed as: 
 
) ,..., , , 1 ( Dd Df t Lt f P - =                                                                                                                             (Eq. 1) 
 
Where: 
 
P is the N-Vector of the logarithms of lobster prices, 
Lt-1 is the corresponding lagged landings Vector (in logarithms), 
t is the logarithm of time and, 
Df, …, Dd  are dummy variables corresponding to the months from February to December. 
 
Due to the export market, the exchange rate between US and Canada is introduced into the model. According to the 
Atlantic Lobster Summit (2007), as the US Dollar declines, the lobster industry in Canada should be shifting away 
from a dependency on the US market. The same authors point out that this declining value has resulted in an 
effective price decline in Canadian dollar terms. Equation (1) then becomes: 
 
) , ,... , , 1 ( ER Dd Df t Lt f P - =                                                                                                                       (Eq. 2) 
 
Where: 
ER is the exchange rate between US and Canada expressed in logarithms. 
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In order to remove the trend caused by the inflation rate (IR) and to better understand the lobster price variations, 
prices in this paper are adjusted for the inflation rate (eq. 3). According to Platt (2008), due to the inflationary 
effects, historic prices may need to be indexed to current dollars. The following method was used: 
 
) 1 /( Pr IR P + =                                                                                                                                                   (Eq. 3) 
 
The real live lobster price (Pr), therefore, is specified as a function of the lagged landings, exchange rate, time and 
season as indicated in equation (4). The hypothesized relationship between the dependent variable (Pr) and each 
explanatory variable is represented by the sign of the explanatory variable: (+) indicates a positive relationship, (-) 
indicates a negative (or inverse) relationship and a (^ ) is a relationship to determine depending on time (dummy 
variable). The Equation (2) is then expressed as follows: 
 
) , ,... , , 1 ( Pr ER Dd Df t Lt f + ^ ^ ^ - - =                                                                                                   (Eq. 4) 
 
This equation was initially estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS) using Simulation For Excel To estimate Risk 
(SIMETAR-2008). In this case, the general specification of the OLS model using the hypothesized signs is as 
follows (eq. 5): 
 
t t t o Df Lnt LnER LnL t Ln e b b b b b + + ^ ^ + - = - ... Pr 4 3 2 2 ) 1 ( 1 1                                                    (Eq. 5)                                
 
Where: 
bk, is the parameter estimated for the kt
h explanatory variable; 
t e , is the error or difference between the observed value and the predicted value for observation t of the dependent 
variable. 
 
Note that in the model, excluding the dummy variables, all the variables are expressed in logarithms. 
 
Results and discussion 
 
To better understand the price variations, Figure 3 shows the operating Quebec Lobster Fishing Areas (LFAs) and 
the Nova Scotia operating LFAs. It appears that Quebec LFAs are operating in the middle of the most productive 
period of Nova Scotia lobster fisheries. On the other hand, the fishery in Nova Scotia is practically year round. The 
Nova Scotia LFAs and Quebec LFAs are reducing their fishing activity at the beginning of the tourist season which 
explains the increasing prices at this period. Thereafter some LFAs in Nova Scotia are still operating. Some of these 
areas are offshore and some of them are accessible even in winter where the lobster fishery represents a very 
lucrative export market to central provinces of Canada.  
 
Figure 3. Operating LFAs during the year in Nova Scotia and Quebec provinces 
 
 
 IIFET 2010 Montpellier Proceedings 
  6 
The Nova Scotia market is also characterized by a large investment in holding technologies compared to Quebec 
province, and an active export market mainly to the United States and central provinces of Canada. The product in 
Quebec is sold mainly on the Quebec market, and holding technologies are just starting to be used. This market and 
regulatory structure in Nova Scotia may allow Nova Scotia producers to capture the effect of price increases due to 
the slowdown in the market during certain periods more easily. However, do these structural differences contribute 
to lower variability of prices in the long term for Nova Scotia, and if so, what are the implications for Quebec 
producers and their attempts at inter-temporal arbitrage?  We try to answer these questions by looking at the “best 
fit” price flexibility equations for Nova Scotia and Quebec, knowing that the variables that explain price flexibility 
in the two cases will be different.   
 
For the Nova Scotia model, the Durbin-Watson test-statistic for serial correlation shows the presence of first order 
positive  serial  correlation.  In  this  study,  the  integration  of  time  and  lagged  landings  may  have  caused  serial 
correlation which does bias our estimates. Consequently a correction for serial correlation for the Nova Scotia model 
has been run using the Rho estimator with the method described by Criddle (2007). The equation of lobster prices 
variations for Nova Scotia using SIMETAR-2008 is expressed below (eq. 6) and the results are summarized in table 
1. 
  
. ) 1 ( 238 . 0 436 . 0 213 . 0 039 . 0 234 . 0 226 . 0 547 . 0 Pr Sept August May t t t D D D LnL Lnt LnER Ln NS - - - - + - = -                    
                        November D 211 . 0 -                                                                                                (Eq. 6) 
 
Table 1. Results of the multiple regression model for Nova Scotia, corrected from serial correlation using the Rho 
estimate. 
 
Independant 
variables 
Exchange 
rate 
Time  Lagged 
landings 
Dummy 
May 
Dummy 
August  
Dummy 
September 
Dummy 
November 
Beta  -0.226  0.234  -0.039  -0.213  -0.436  -0.238  -0.211 
S.E.  0.159  0.028  0.009  0.034  0.036  0.042  0.034 
│t-test│  8.34  4.34  1.57  6.15  12.13  5.61  6.16 
 
 
Table 2 presents the results of the OLS statistics for the Nova Scotia corrected model. 
 
 
Table 2. OLS Regression Statistics for Nova Scotia Corrected model. 
 
F-test  40.184  Prob(F)  0.000 
MSE
1/2  0.139  CV Regr  22.153 
R
2  0.565  Durbin-Watson  1.879 
RBar
2  0.550  Rho  0.029 
Akaike Information Criterion  -3.924  Goldfeld-Quandt  0.534 
Schwarz Information Criterion  -3.817     
 
 
In the Quebec model, the presence of serial correlation is not significant. This may be due to the lagged landings 
variable removing from the model (equation 7). 
 
. 305 . 1 397 . 1 344 . 1 32 . 1 094 . 1 092 . 0 259 . 0 Pr Aug July June May April t D D D D D Lnt Ln QC + + + + + + - =                                          
           (0.146)       (0.032)            (0.112)              (0.112)          (0.112)            (0.112)               (0.112) 
  (Eq. 7) 
 
In comparing the two price series visually, we can see that the variation in real or deflated prices is wider in Quebec 
than in NS, although the time signature does suggest increasing demand, and it seems more pronounced in the Nova 
Scotia case than in the Quebec case (Figure 4)  IIFET 2010 Montpellier Proceedings 
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Accordingly, it appears that lagged landings in Quebec are not a good explainer of price variations because landings 
in Quebec LFAs occur when the most of the Eastern Canada LFAs are operating as well. We used a Two Stages 
Least Squares method to estimate a simultaneous equation system for Nova Scotia and Quebec, and we put Quebec 
Prices (Ln (Pr Qct)) as a dependant variable with the same explanatory variables shown in equation (7) and the 
explanatory variables of the Nova Scotia model as instrumental variables, to allow the possibility that residuals of 
both equations are correlated. The results correspond to those found in equation (b) (R
2= 0.674; F-test reduced (0.05;6;∞) 
=75.938). The Mean Absolute Percent Error (MAPE = 14.36%) is a measure of a model’s forecasting ability. It is 
minimized (which is desirable in general when selecting the best forecasting model). the equation (7) becomes the 
equation (8) and the results are summarized in tables 3 and 4:  
 
e + + + + + + + - = . 306 . 1 398 . 1 345 . 1 32 . 1 094 . 1 086 . 0 121 . 0 Pr Aug July June May April t D D D D D Lnt Ln QC  
(Eq. 8) 
 
Tableau 3. Results of the two Stage Least Square for Quebec model 
.                                                          
Independant 
variables 
Time  Dummy 
April 
Dummy 
May 
Dummy 
June  
Dummy  
July 
Dummy  
August 
Beta  0.086  1.094  1.32  1.35  1.398  1.306 
S.E.  0.032  0.112  0.112  0.112  0.112  0.112 
│t-test│  2.72  9.788  11.815  12.031  12.509  11.684 
 
 
Table 4. OLS Regression Statistics for Quebec Corrected model. 
 
F-test  75,938  Prob(F)  0.000 
MSE
1/2  0.455  CV Regr  64.297 
R
2  0.674  Durbin-Watson  1.865 
RBar
2  0.665  Rho  0.066 
Akaike Information Criterion  -1.551  Goldfeld-Quandt  0.473 
Schwarz Information Criterion  -1.461     
 
In order to understand the effect of the passage of time (which would capture structural, management, and technical 
changes overall) on the price variations, a comparison between the trend of real (deflated) prices in Nova Scotia and 
Quebec was made according to equation (6) and (8) respectively.  
 
Figure 4 illustrates the variations of observed corrected prices on one hand, and the estimated (predicted) values 
provided by the model on the other hand.  
 
Figure 4.  Observed and estimated filtered prices for Nova Scotia and Quebec 
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The model for Nova Scotia indicates an increasing trend until the 52
sd period (corresponding to march, 1994) where 
the model started a stationary trend. The series for Quebec indicates a continuously increasing trend.  Figure 5 
shows a clear cyclical effect caused by the variations of prices due to the touristic season and the fishing seasons for 
both of the models. To better analyse this effect, a seasonal decomposition of filtered price logarithms has been 
made.  According  to  Cheng  and  Townsend  (1993),  it  is  desirable  to  provide  an  assessment  of  the  estimated 
parameters to better analyse the cyclical effect raised before. To provide that assessment, data series from 2007 to 
2008 were used to determine the out-of-sample predictions for Nova Scotia and Quebec. In this case we dropped 
monthly data from 2007 to 2008, this data was not used in the overall estimation which was the full sample of 216 
months (18 years) minus 12 (the last year) The last period (dotted) shown in Figure 5 demonstrates that in general 
the predictive performance of the model is quite good for Nova Scotia and Quebec. Indeed, the predictive values 
follow the pattern of the real situation. It also indicates that for Quebec the cycle appears to have more within season 
variability, but the seasonality, defined as the repetitive and predictable movement around the trend line in one year 
or less, is well determined through the years. Seasonality is measured in terms of an index called a seasonal index 
which is attached to each period of the time series within a year. In this paper 12 separate indices are considered, one 
for each month. To calculate this seasonal index we used SIMETAR-2008 based on the simple averages method, 
also called average percentage method because it expresses the data of each month as a percentage of the average of 
the year (see Sharma, 2009). The cycle, defined as an upturn or downturn not tied to seasonal variation and which 
usually results from changes in economic conditions (Arsham, 1996), is also calculated using SIMETAR-2008 by 
expressing each actual value in the time series as a percentage of the calculated trend for the same date, the resulting 
time series has no trend but oscillates around a central value of 100. In Nova Scotia, seasons are clearly determined, 
and the cycle much more stable than Quebec through seasons demonstrating a stabilisation tendency of prices. 
Consequently, there is a significant difference between the live lobster prices tendency in Quebec and Nova Scotia.  
 
Figure 5. Cyclical indices and seasonal decomposition for Quebec and Nova Scotia 
 
 
 
Finally, this model shows the difference between situations where industrials use a holding system technology to 
take advantage of the increasing prices (Nova Scotia) and another one in Quebec where this technology is less 
developed.  
 
Figure 6. Live lobster prices for Nova Scotia model (technological effect) 
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The figure (6 a) for the Nova Scotia Model, shows a trend. As seen before, the first period of time is characterized 
by an increasing tendency of price variations, thereafter the trend becomes stationary.   we run an impulse response 
function    used  in  a  vector  autoregression  to  determine  the  effects  of  a  shock  to  the  system  using  the  method 
described by Richardson et al. (2004), In Simetar, the impulse response function returns the number of time periods 
a system takes to stabilize (Richardson et al., 2004). A decreasing impulse response function shown in figure (6b) 
means the model is stationary for inflation rate filtered prices. This result is confirmed by the Dickey-Fuller Test 
absolute value (17.67 ˃ D-Fcritical, 0.05=-2.9). This value means that the hypothesis of a non stationary data is rejected. 
For Quebec, even if prices are filtered for inflation, the structural tendency of prices is towards an increase (Figure 
7).  
 
Figure 7. Live lobster real deflated prices trend for Quebec model  
 
 
 
That is, this difference between the trend in Nova Scotia and in Quebec could be explained by differences in the 
long term induced technology effects, and the structural effects of the market.  When both demand and supply are 
stationary or moving out proportionately and are not limited by stock effects, the effect is a stationary price series.  
When demand is growing relatively faster than supply, on the other hand, this leads to a consistent upward trend in 
prices.  The fact that Quebec has used mainly input controls, including season length, to manage their fishery may 
have led to highly variable prices. Passive technological adoption in the fleet may increase real effort, which in the 
face of stock constraints leads to rising costs.  Holding pen technology adoption by fishers associations can be 
expected to mitigate that variability, bringing seasonal prices more in line with the rest of Eastern Canada, and will 
likely lead to increased transitional profits for fishers, as the seasonal constraint becomes artificially removed.  In 
Nova Scotia, on the other hand, lobster holding systems are much more wide-spread than they are in Quebec. The 
introduction of that technology in order to capture the effect of price variations may have caused a smoothing trend 
of price variations. Indeed, the price spikes due to the tourist season in Nova Scotia in a long term view, is captured 
by fishers and owners of lobster holding facilities. But why do we see the price trends in Nova Scotia tending 
towards  stationarity?  It  may  have  to  do  with  a  less  imposing  stock  constraint,  increases  in  productive  and 
management efficiencies that have kept pace with demand, and the widespread use of lobster holding facilities.   
 
However, this begs an important question.  What can Quebec fishers expect from a wide-spread adoption of lobster 
holding technology, given the present public management structure of their fishery?  IIFET 2010 Montpellier Proceedings 
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Wilson (2009) has recently shown that in the lobster fisheries of eastern Québec between 2000 and 2006, the 
parameters  associated  with  effective  effort  in  the  lobster  fleet  in  Gaspé  and  the  Magdalene  islands  has  been 
increasing overall, despite regulatory measures aimed at controlling it.  The reasons why this might happen could be 
exogenous to this study, which centers upon price.  However, fisheries economic theory certainly predicts that price 
increases, for whatever reason, can have an impact upon the growth in effective effort. Therefore, price arbitrage 
might reasonably provoke passive technological changes in fleets that lead to cost-price squeeze over time, thereby 
partially negating the positive effect of that price arbitrage.  This is especially true in cases where input controls are 
predominantly used to limit nominal effort.  To see this, look at Figure 8. This is a theoretical representation of a 
fishery based upon a Gordon-Schaefer yield effort relationship.  The long run industry offer curve can be backward 
bending,  but  in  this  case  we  assume  that  it  is  the  sum  of  individual  vessel  marginal  cost  curves,  and  is  not 
necessarily always at competitive long term equilibrium. We make no particular assumption about homogeneity of 
vessels, although in the case of Quebec, the productive units seem fairly homogeneous. Although the fishery faces a 
stock constraint,  management  measures  may be  such that it allows the collective group to capture rents.  The 
fishermen group has the choice of promoting a change in industry structure away from input controls, which would 
lead to a gradual lowering of the long run costs at P, or adopting on-shore holding technologies and enjoying the 
possibility of having a long term price net of the costs of holding at P*, but keeping input controls in the fishery.   
 
In this case, each fisher does enjoy an increase in profit that is comparable to what might have been obtained with 
management restructuring (P*BPA), and if the group is small enough and contracting costs are low enough, (and 
costs of exclusion are small, and spill-over effects with other groups slight) such a technology adoption could yield 
long term profit gains (point B).  However, because inputs can be substituted, fishers gradually engage in active and 
passive technological adoption, that increases the real effort of the fleet.  In the face of a stock constraint, this pushes 
up the average costs of the industry, which then in the long run will compete away the profits created by the 
technological adoption of holding technologies (point C).  In addition, suppose that this technology is subsidized by 
a government agency, as a means of providing relief to fishers.  The resulting equilibrium would then undermine 
any efforts by that same government, or another level of government, at stock re-building and management.   
 
Figure 8.  Rent capture and dissipation arising from the adoption of holding technologies.  For simplicity, we assume 
that the industry is a long run common pool equilibrium at point A. Reorganization and technological adoption 
could result in rents (P*BPA).  Increasing real effort in the fishery could cause the LRAC to rise with rents being 
dissipated (C). 
 
 
 
Because of this, the adoption of lobster holding technologies may be a very good thing for fishers in the short to 
medium term, if it is something that can be done in conjunction with more fundamental changes in the management IIFET 2010 Montpellier Proceedings 
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structure of the fishery, using approaches that reinforce or develop an effective system of property rights. However, 
encouraging these methods without more fundamental management change may provoke both over-exploitation of 
stocks and the competing away of these transitory gains.   
 
Concluding remarks 
 
We started the paper and discussion by describing the lobster pound technologies that were being studied by the 
fishers association in Grande Rivière Québec.  Using a standard technical and financial analysis, we found what 
seemed to be the best technology for them.  However, subsequent discussions on the likely long term gains led us to 
compare price flexibility equations for Quebec and for Nova Scotia, where such technologies are wide-spread.  We 
found that price variability was lower there, but then we noticed that the actual legal seasons were longer, and that 
may  have been related to other factors, including the  style of public  management of  the  fishery there.  These 
revelations raised a number of questions about the Quebec case.  The inevitable reduction in price variations as a 
result of adopting this technology will also extend the season artificially, but are the in-season controls on real effort 
efficient?  Is there a discernable difference between collective public management structure and industry structure? 
Will the gains in profit experienced by fisheries associations which adopt lobster holding technology be competed 
away, because the fishery is based mainly upon input controls which make real effort growth in the sector harder to 
control?  And finally, how isolated is the Quebec live market in reality?  
 
Regional  development  agencies  are  often  enthusiastic  about  the  possibilities  of  proposing  different  technical 
solutions for local fishermen’s groups aimed at improving profitability.  Adopting techniques that allow producers to 
engage in price arbitrage seems to be an easy way to improve profits of fishers, and even to promote a more even 
distribution of a valuable commodity over time.  The fact that such activities strongly resemble other arbitrage 
activities, such as forward contracting, reinforces the perception that adopting such technologies is a move towards 
greater efficiencies.  We share that enthusiasm  with two  caveats.  First, Quebec is arguably a province  where 
relations between Federal and Provincial instances seem less coordinated.  Land based policies promulgated by 
MAPAQ, a Quebec minister with interests in fisheries, might be promoted to improve the livelihoods of fishers, but 
there may not be a clear understanding of the links between these policies and the challenges of public management 
at  the  Federal  level,  and  vice-versa.    In  the  case  of  competing  policies,  sustainable  management  may  actually 
become more difficult.   Second, industry members must be made aware that until property rights and incentives in 
the fishery itself are organized such that the asset value of the stock being exploited is truly being  managed by the 
stock  holders,  prisoner’s  dilemma  common  pool  behavior  can  set  in,  leading  to  passive  technical  change  and 
subsequent  cost  squeeze.    If  governments  use  direct  and  indirect  subsidies  to  help  regional  fishers  adopt  such 
technologies, these competitive effects may become accentuated.  There is some reason to believe that even in a 
fishery as well-managed as the lobster industry in Quebec, the property incentives in the industry are not yet to a 
point where these incentives are limited.   
 
The very nature of arbitrage implies a leveling out of price variations over time, as has been seen in other areas like 
Nova Scotia.   Both of these phenomena can eventually put competitive pressure on fishers even with the new 
holding technology.  Our message therefore could be that in addition to encouraging the adoption of holding pen 
technology,  development  agencies  and  fisheries  management  agencies  should  work  together  at  better  defining 
property rights that are compatible with behaviors which are sustainable.  
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